Given the divergence between Scotland and England in the\nrecent election results, many have rightly questioned the future of the United\nKingdom. The gains made by the SNP, and indeed by nationalist parties in\nNorthern Ireland, are quite striking. However, I think that the break up of the\nUK is further off than is suggested by some, and in fact is unlikely to happen\nin the foreseeable future. I shall make a couple of specific predictions to\nelaborate on why I think this is the case.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
My first prediction is that there will be a second Scottish\nindependence referendum this parliament, and Scotland will vote to remain in\nthe UK. Of course, the Tory line remains that the 2014 referendum was a once in\na generation choice, and the Prime Minister has ruled out another vote for now.\nBut while Johnson\u2019s government may have the legal sovereignty to withhold\n\u201cIndyref2\u201d, politically he cannot fairly fend off Sturgeon\u2019s claim for long\ngiven that the SNP won roughly an equal share of the vote in Scotland as the\nTories won across the UK. If Johnson has a mandate for Brexit, surely Sturgeon\ncan claim a mandate for another referendum north of the border. Right now, what\nthe government is refusing to do is to devolve power to Holyrood to initiate a\nreferendum. But sooner or later, Johnson will feel that he must go ahead and\nsettle the matter once and for all, by legislating in Westminster to hold just\nsuch a vote.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Yet this time around, the UK government will decide on both\nthe timing and the franchise. Brexit should come by the end of 2020 officially.\nRealistically it may take up to two years. But either way, most sensible Scots\n\u2013 even those who favour independence \u2013 will recognise that there cannot be\nanother referendum north of the border until it is clear what the final UK-EU\nrelationship actually is. Only then will they be voting on a settlement rather\nthan on mere speculation. The SNP will have to run their \u201cIndyref2\u201d campaign\nlargely on a remain \/ re-join the EU platform, because the change in the UK\u2019s\nrelationship with the EU was their original reason for demanding a new\nindependence referendum. They posed after the 2016 Brexit vote as the champions\nof the 62% of Scots who chose remain. The SNP may clamour for a vote this year,\nbut the Johnson government will look reasonable in holding them off until the\ntransition period is over, and thus the choice clear.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
A 2021 referendum would also come after Alex Salmond (former\nSNP leader and mentor of Sturgeon) has been hauled through the courts on sexual\nassault charges, and very likely after the SNP have been hauled over the coals\nin the May 2021 Scottish parliamentary elections on their very sketchy\nachievements governing the country they want to rule as an independent nation\nstate. The \u201ctry before you buy\u201d sales pitch of the SNP is not going well right\nnow, with Scottish devolved education in particular looking in a mess.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
As for the franchise, Cameron\u2019s coalition government conceded\nfar more to the SNP on this than it needed to. If it genuinely cares about the\nunion as much as it claims, Johnson\u2019s Conservative government will not be so\ncomplacent. The horse has probably bolted on votes at sixteen, but the Tories\nmay very well give the right to vote to any Scottish-born British citizen\nresiding elsewhere in the UK. These votes will be overwhelmingly unionist.\nCould wee Nicola pose between her saltires and tell us in her coached Celtic\npronunciation that those sons and daughters of the glens should be denied a say\nin the destiny of their motherland? Not whilst granting temporarily resident\nEuropean students a vote like last time around. That is my reckoning.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Could the SNP still win it? This is very hard to predict of\ncourse, and there is no doubting that Scottish nationalism has moved firmly\ninto the political mainstream in the past decade, and may yet win through. But\nthe 2019 general election result, taking into account that every vote against\nthe SNP was basically a unionist vote, still indicates at the most about 45% in\nfavour of full independence. And once a campaign gets going, the SNP will have\nsome very awkward questions to answer, more awkward than last time around. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Will breaking away from the UK under a minority Holyrood\ngovernment be a simpler matter than the UK breaking away from the EU under a\nminority Westminster government? It is easier breaking away from a forty-year\nunion or a four hundred-year union? I doubt it; and if I were a Scottish swing\nvoter, I would doubt it too given recent and ongoing events. Could Scotland\nre-join the EU? Can it be guaranteed that the Spanish government won\u2019t veto\naccession? (The Spaniards are keen to avoid encouraging separatism because of\nCatalonia; and other EU member states are anxious on similar grounds, most notably\nBelgium, Italy and even Germany.) If the SNP cannot guarantee this core\ncampaign pitch, then that is a lot of downside risk for voters to swallow.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
What about the currency? Given that an independent Scotland\nwill straight away be running a budget deficit that exceeds the criteria\nrequired to join the Euro, that may not be possible in the near term. It might\nbe possible longer term but, to balance the books, Scotland would have to junk\nall those nice (Westminster funded) free tuition fees and prescription charges\nthat the SNP is so keen to boast about. That\u2019s a high price to pay,\nparticularly when voters will be aware that the Euro has not worked well at all\nfor its peripheral member states. But they can pay for it all with the North\nSea Oil, right? Wrong. It is highly unclear who would own that after independence,\nand its financial returns are diminishing quickly in any case. What about\nremaining with the pound? That\u2019s just taking orders from London without having\na say \u2013 a sort of May Chequers plan for Scotland.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I wouldn\u2019t want to run that campaign for all the haggis in\nthe Highlands. So, what is my overall prediction? \u201cIndyref2\u201d in the autumn of\n2022, 60% to remain in the UK. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
My second prediction is that the nationalist swing in\nNorthern Ireland will not threaten the union. Much has been said for a long\ntime now about the gradual demographic drift in Northern Ireland, with\nCatholics steadily starting to outnumber Protestants, and in any case\nsectarianism is on the wane. The Irish Republic is far from the basket case\nthat unionist firebrands once demonised, and most people in Northern Ireland\ntake a benign and positive view of their close and borderless relationship with\ntheir now prosperous and modern neighbour. An entire generation has now grown\nup without any serious sectarian strife. With all the uncertainties around\nBrexit for Northern Ireland, this election may have signalled a shift in\nattitudes, with more nationalist MPs elected than unionist for the first time. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
However, I cannot see this seriously indicating any\nsentiment for a united Ireland among any part of the province\u2019s electorate\nother than the minority of firm nationalists and republicans who have never\nreally felt any other way. More likely this electoral shift has displayed a\ndisenchantment with the polarisation of Ulster politics and the continued\nsuspension of the power-sharing government, with voters choosing more centrist\nparties. The biggest vote share gain was for the avowedly centrist and\nnon-sectarian Alliance Party. Only Sinn Fein and the DUP \u2013 at the extremes \u2013\nlost votes. This was a punishment for the shambles of Stormont, mixed in\nperhaps with some soft pro-EU remain sentiment (votes for the moderate\nnationalist SDLP also went up). It may also have registered disquiet at the\nmessiness of the UK government\u2019s proposed trade arrangements for the province\nin the event of the final Brexit deal. But it was not a vote against the union\nwith the UK as such.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Furthermore, it should be remembered that a key clause of\nthe Good Friday Agreement of 1998, which ended The Troubles, was that Dublin\ndrop its long-standing constitutional claim to a united Ireland. Any move away\nfrom this position would quickly re-ignite the dormant protestant sectarianism\nin Ulster. When they feel threatened, Ulster Unionists have time and again in\nthe past mobilised politically, and indeed militarily. I am not arguing that\nany such development is imminent. But if the British state struggled to contain\nand neutralise the threat of the IRA, then the Irish Republic will have no\nchance of containing and neutralising the Ulster Volunteer Force. Dublin knows\nthis, and therefore has no aspiration to govern Ulster. Dublin wants a free\ntrade relationship across the island of Ireland as far as possible, and nothing\nmore. If Johnson\u2019s Brexit settlement can make this work fairly effectively,\nthen the future of Northern Ireland will be within the UK.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Some have portrayed the Conservatives as themselves a party\nof English nationalism, rather than of unionism. But the Tories are still the\nsecond largest party in both Scotland and Wales, and they remain openly\ncommitted to the UK. This government has work to do in seeing off the challenge\nof nationalism over the coming parliament. Much will depend upon the realities\nof Brexit. But the chances are that the United Kingdom will still be intact in\n2030, and probably beyond.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Von Hayek<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"